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Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act: 
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An Analogy 
with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the 
Protection Available in the European Community. 
By Silvia Beltrametti*
¶1 Is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act a necessary addition to the Intellectual 
Property panorama of the United States?  American designers and other creative minds 
do not have any means to protect their innovative design creations because none of the 
existing intellectual property measures can be tailored to the protection of design rights.  
To explore this issue, I go back to the underlying reasons for prohibiting the trade of 
counterfeit goods and I argue that counterfeiting and design piracy are analytically 
similar and there is no reason justifying a different legal treatment of these two issues, 
especially given the close interrelation of these two phenomena.  After demonstrating that 
the current intellectual property measures are inadequate for the protection of design 
rights, I provide arguments for the need of such protection and include a full analysis of 
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act.  Finally, I compare the Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
with the European design protection system and argue that much can be gained from 
looking at the European experience. 
 
“You may imitate but never counterfeit.” 
Honoré De Balzac 
 
I. ISSUES 
¶2 By passing the Counterfeiting Act in 1984, Congress explicitly acknowledged the 
evils of counterfeiting and imposed severe penalties on activities associated with it.  
Counterfeiting involves the use of a spurious trademark on non-original merchandise, 
most frequently on clothes and fashion accessories, such as bags and sunglasses.  The 
fake labels and logos are usually applied on copies of products that have proved 
successful in the market.  This means that before the logo is applied to a product, the 
design of the real item has to be copied.  The copy of a design is in fact a counterfeit 
without a label, but not legally recognized as such.  The aim of this paper is to illustrate 
the need for the protection of fashion designs. 
 
* LL.M. University of Chicago. I am extremely grateful to Randal Picker and David Zarfes for many 
helpful comments and encouragement.  I am also thankful for the help of Nikhil Abraham, Lawrence 
Apolzon, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Tony Bangs, Alan D’Ambrosio, Paul Heald, Sheila Henderson, 
Barbara Kolsun, Benjamin Moll, Frederick Mostert, Charles Weigel and seminar participants at the 
University of Chicago for sharing their comments. 
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¶3 The fashion design industry in the U.S. is part of intellectual property’s negative 
space as fashion designs do not per se enjoy intellectual property protection.  
Explanations for the existence of this negative space rely mainly on public choice theory; 
historically, intellectual property legislation was enacted when a sufficiently well-
organized and well-funded group lobbied for protection without potent opposition.  
Although Congress considered up to seventy bills advocating some form of legal 
protection for fashion designs since 1914,1
¶4 On the other side of the Atlantic, in the European Union, a well grounded system 
for design protection has been in place since 2002.  This system grants a two-tier 
protection to registered and unregistered designs.  The winning weapon in the European 
scenario is the protection for unregistered designs:  without the need to register, designers 
have the choice of enforcing their rights.  It has been argued that the paucity of cases that 
make it to court testifies to the fact that designers do not really insist on applying their 
rights.  This is not necessarily true, but is rather a sign that design disputes are resolved 
through confidential settlements.  However, this trend is slowly changing as two strong 
precedents have been laid down recently. 
 the major reason for refraining from enacting 
legislation directly covering design rights has been lethargy and lack of coordination of a 
united voice within the fashion community.  Its fast-moving nature and peculiar creative 
dynamics are also part of the reason why fashion is one of the few innovative industries 
that is not protected by tailored intellectual property laws.  Given the lack of a legal tool 
designed for the exclusive enforcement of clothing and fashion accessory designs, 
designers have to rely on the existing copyright protection, occasionally on trade-dress, 
and otherwise on design patents.  However, these standard intellectual property options 
are only capable of offering a rather uncertain protection and can be cumbersome and 
time-consuming to attain. 
¶5 Partly to reach some sort of alignment with European design protection and partly 
to comply with the public policy goal of rewarding effort and incentivizing innovation, 
the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA) was introduced in the U.S. in 2006.  There is a 
lot of controversy around the proposed legislation, which is still pending in Congress.  
This paper will demonstrate that the DPPA is a good start for the introduction of design 
rights in the U.S. even if some aspects would have to be revised.  Although this measure 
is a less powerful tool than its European counterpart, much can be gained from looking at 
the European experience and even if historically the Americans have a more litigious 
nature, in the end it is difficult not to see how this bill would improve the legal scenario 
governing the fashion industry in the U.S.  The rapid pace of technological innovation 
enables faster copying in larger quantities at the expense of creative design, and makes 
the present low IP equilibrium no longer justifiable.  In addition, in this challenging 
economic environment, the current inadequacies that reward copycats and act as a 
 
1 Anya Jenkins Ferris, Comment, Real Art Calls For Real Legislation: An Argument Against Adoption 
Of The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 564 (2008).  See also Susan 
Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH, 119-121 (2006) for a historical account of the most important acts designed to protect textile and 
clothing designs considered by Congress over the 20th century, the most important ones being the 1913 
Kahn act and the 1926 Vestal Bill.  See Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 246-56 (1944) and 
Self-Protection of Design Creation in the Millinery Industry, 49  YALE L.J. 1290 (1940) for a description of 
other forms of action taken by U.S. clothing and textile manufacturers to supplement the lobbying efforts to 
achieve design protection—like the establishment of the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America in 1932. 
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disincentive to creators negatively impact the ability of American designers to compete in 
the global market. 
¶6 I will deal with the issues raised above in the following order.  First, in section II, I 
suggest that there is no rationale in distinguishing counterfeiting from design piracy.  
After that, in section III, I inspect to what extent the current intellectual property laws 
available in the U.S. are capable of protecting clothing designs and fashion accessories.  
In section IV, I put forward the reasons in favor of passing the DPPA, and in section V, I 
analyze the proposed piece of legislation and its shortcomings.  In section VI, I explain 
how the framework of the DPPA could gain by bringing its legal standards closer to the 
ones set out in the European Regulation on Design Rights.  Finally, I conclude that, for 
the time being, the DPPA is an appropriate and non-excessive initiative, but that, in the 
long run, more needs to be done in order to achieve optimal protection for the design 
industry. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT AND ANALOGIES WITH COUNTERFEITING 
¶7 The U.S. Constitution permits the protection of intellectual property of U.S. 
citizens who deserve to reap the benefits of their creativity and inventions:  Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts.”2  Congress can award exclusive rights for a limited amount of time to 
compensate creators and inventors for the time and effort they devoted to their own 
intellectual investments, as this will ensure the development of creative industries.  This 
type of incentive is thought to be crucial for America to maintain a leading position for 
innovation in the global marketplace.3
¶8 Piracy means taking somebody’s design and replicating it in such manner that 
nobody would know the difference between the original and the copy, and passing off the 
copy as the original.  That is clearly wrong and the law must address it.  The lack of legal 
protection for fashion designs is odd, especially if we think of design piracy as a similar, 
but in many ways more subtle beast than counterfeiting.  Counterfeiting involves the 
“knowing use of a spurious mark which is identical with or substantially 
indistinguishable from a registered trademark, in connection with the trafficking of 
counterfeit merchandise.”
  Although the constitutional standpoint emphasizes 
that it is creative individuals and not the financial well-being of the fashion industry that 
has to be protected, the mechanism of giving out intellectual property protection should 
not occur automatically.  It is crucial that rights are given out when clear benefits are 
present and the economic growth of the country is not adversely affected. 
4
 
2 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See also ROBERT DESTY & ALBERT BRUNNER, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 22 (2d ed. Sumner Whitney, 1884). 
3 Intellectual property makes up more than half of all U.S. exports, driving 40% of the country's growth.  
See http://www.uschamber.com/IP.htm (last visited on Mar. 13, 2010). U.S. intellectual property is worth 
$5-5.5 trillion - more than the gross domestic product (GDP) of any other country.  See 
http://washingtontechnology.org/community/forums/post/628.aspx (last visited on Mar. 13, 2010).  
According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, intellectual property in this country is worth more than 
$5 trillion - about twice the amount of the current federal budget.  See Sean Silverthrone, Monetizing IP: 
The Executive's Challenge, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING KNOWLEDGE (June 9, 2008), available 
at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pdf/item/5925.pdf. 
  Usually, “counterfeit merchandise is made so as to imitate a 
4 Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, §1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984).  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2008) (for definitions); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d) (2008) (for civil actions); 18 U.S.C. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 150
well-known product in all details of construction . . . .”5
¶9 Congress has responded to the threat of counterfeiting with various legal 
measures.
  Also, within the realm of 
fashion, counterfeiting generally starts with design piracy:  before a counterfeited 
trademark is applied to a bag or piece of clothing its design must first be copied.  A copy 
of a design is really a counterfeit without the label.  If no design piracy existed, there 
would probably be no counterfeiting.  Piracy and counterfeiting are in many ways 
interrelated and both deserve to be addressed by effective legislative measures, otherwise 
a young designer with no brand recognition is left defenseless against the problem of 
piracy, and famous designers will only be protected if, in addition to their designs, their 
trademarked labels are taken too. 
6  Among them is the Counterfeiting Act of 1984, which imposes severe 
penalties on counterfeiting charges.  Counterfeit remedies include criminal penalties, ex 
parte civil seizure orders and statutory damages, as well as mandatory attorney’s fees and 
treble damages.  It is to be noted that the remedies listed above apply absent “extenuating 
circumstances” where the use of the counterfeit mark was intentional, in which case the 
legal treatment can be even harsher.7  These severe punitive measures go far beyond 
remedying the usual harms of a trademark owner, such as diverted sales, loss of goodwill 
and reputation and dilution of the mark’s distinctiveness.  They exist to redress other 
potentially more far reaching injuries to the public.8  Counterfeit operations have a very 
serious effect on the global economy, such as lost jobs and tax revenues and, in addition, 
counterfeited items can pose a substantial threat to health and safety.  Just think of a 
children’s dress made of highly flammable fabric or eyeglasses made of toxic material.  
There is also evidence linking counterfeit activities to organized crime and terrorist 
organizations, which use counterfeiting as a money laundering and funding device.9  
These illegal economies that thrive under globalization, and on which consumers 
unwittingly feed, explain the need for the far reaching legal measures imposed on product 
counterfeiting, a $250 billion business that translates into 750,000 lost jobs.10
 
§2320 (2008) (for further statutory and criminal remedies). 
5 5A J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.01 (3d ed. 
1992). 
6 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2008), allows the U.S. to sanction countries 
that fail to provide “the right of establishment or protection of intellectual property rights.”  The 
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996), imposes 
liability on to those who unknowingly or unintentionally participate in the importation of goods, including 
attorney’s, CPA’s, freight forwarders, custom’s brokers, etc.  See also Copyright Felony Act, Pub. L. No. 
102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1994); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 
Stat. 941 (1970); Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).   
7 Id. 
8 GINSBURG, LITMAN & KELVIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 958 (Foundation Press, 
4th ed. 2007). 
9 See The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, http://www.iacc.org (last visited on Mar. 13, 
2010); Barbara Kolsum, Global Enforcement, 517 PLI/PAT 533 (1998); Bruce Siegal, Developments in 
Counterfeiting Legislation Enforcement, 468 PLI/PAT 441, 453 (1997); Katherine C. Spelman, Combating 
Counterfeiting, 417 PLI/PAT 309, 337 (1995) (“counterfeiting has become a core activity for organized 
crime because of the big rewards and low risk of prosecution”).  
 
10 Data taken from http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2006/september/06-158.htm (last visited 
on Mar. 23, 2010) (“Counterfeiting and piracy cost the U.S. economy more than $250 billion a year and an 
estimated 750,000 jobs,” said David Hirschmann, senior vice president of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.).  See also The Spread of Counterfeiting: Knock-offs Catch On, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15610089.  The 
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¶10 Sophisticated counterfeiting strategies do not only operate in a domestic ambit, 
they operate globally.  This is the result of the unprecedented rise of technology that we 
have been witnessing in the past decade.  The widespread use of scanners, laser copiers 
and the Internet enable counterfeiters and pirates in developing countries to copy and 
manufacture products even before the original items hit the market.  Counterfeiters 
thereby free-ride on the enormous investments that designers have incurred launching 
new brands and design collections.  Counterfeiting must be addressed on an international 
level since often the copies of the original goods are produced in countries where labor is 
cheap, and then imported into other countries.  There have been several responses to this 
global problem.  For example, customs cooperation measures between many countries 
are in place to stop the entry of counterfeit goods at the boarders, and the advent of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) together with the implementation of its Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) have forced many 
countries around the world to recognize the value that lies in the protection of intellectual 
property rights and the necessity to combat counterfeiting on a global scale.11
¶11 Counterfeiting and design piracy are analytically similar and to a certain extent 
complementary problems developing in the same globalized world.  Oddly, the former 
one is legally prohibited while the latter one is not.  There is no reason why this different 
treatment of similar issues should continue, especially given the close interrelation of 
these two phenomena.  In some instances, not only does the legal copying of fashion 
designs harm their creators, it also provides manufacturers with a mechanism for 
circumventing the current campaign against counterfeit trademarks.  U.S. Customs are 
entitled to stop, seize and destroy fake trademarked apparel and accessories entering the 
U.S.  If, however, the same items are shipped without labels, they can freely enter the 
country.  In this scenario, distributors attach the counterfeit labels and logos at a later 
stage, once the goods are inside the country, so that there is less chance of detection by 
law enforcement.  The continued exclusion of most fashion designs from IP protection 
thus undermines federal policy with respect to trademarks by perpetuating a loophole in 
the intellectual property law system. 
  Although 
much remains to be done in terms of effective enforcement, many underdeveloped 
countries started to understand that they have a vested interest in protecting intellectual 
property rights because it attracts foreign investment. 
 
Economist reported that 
The OECD estimates that the international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods was 
worth around $250 billion in 2007.  The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
(IACC), a lobby group, says the true figure is actually closer to $600 billion, because the 
OECD’s estimate does not include online piracy or counterfeits that are sold in the same 
country as they are made.  Counterfeit goods make up 5-7% of world trade, according to 
the IACC.  In 2008, the value of fake goods seized at America’s borders increased by 
nearly 40% over the year before.  It subsequently fell by 4% last year—far less than the 
25% decline in imports overall.”). 
Id. 
11 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed in Marrakesh, Morocco 
on April 15, 1994.  Part II of TRIPS sets out standards concerning the availability, scope and use of 
intellectual property rights and Part III specifically deals with enforcement measures.  See also World 
Trade Organization, WTO Trade Topics: Textiles Monitory Body (TMB), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm (last visited on Mar. 27, 2010). 
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¶12 Similar legal standards should apply in similar instances.  Both counterfeiting and 
design piracy involve illicit imitations that deny a creator the fruits of his labor.  
Intellectual efforts are being copied and exploited without permission and to the 
detriment of the legitimate owner.  These analogies justify the introduction of intellectual 
property protection for design rights.  Of course granting only the right is not enough; 
enforcement and an effective court system that deals with violations must be put in place 
in order to create an efficient mechanism of protection.  In addition, cooperation with the 
industry in order to combine enforcement efforts can be crucial to understand the real 
need for legislation and the best way to implement rules.  Once this is in place, a wider 
global cooperation to tackle the piracy problem with harmonized regulations can be 
envisaged.  This can be done by building on the enforcement mechanisms of national and 
international anti-counterfeiting measures already in place. 
¶13 The absence of proper intellectual property rights that give designers standing to 
enforce their rights gives rise to trade distortion.  If counterfeited items are prohibited, 
pirated design copies deserve the same treatment.  The bottom line is the same: in both 
cases, the losses created are passed on in the form of higher prices and increasingly 
consumers are being exposed to dangerous materials from which the copies are made.  A 
myriad of reasons have been brought forward for the legal prohibition of counterfeiting—
there is no reason why they should not apply to design piracy too.12
III. CURRENT DESIGN PROTECTION IN THE U.S. 
 
¶14 In the United States, designers currently rely on three existing forms of protection: 
copyright, trade dress, and design patents.  I will now proceed to illustrate the scope of 
these existing measures. 
A. Copyright 
¶15 United States copyright laws protect original forms of expressions fixed in a 
tangible medium for the life of the author plus 70 years.13  Copyright protection covers 
diverse works such as literature, art, music and architectural drawings, and if the 
originality threshold is met, it punishes the creation of substantially similar works.14  One 
would think that fashion designs are encompassed,15
 
12 There may be some theoretical economic arguments in favour of counterfeiting.  For example, one 
may argue that counterfeiting puts downward pressure on prices, which ultimately benefits consumers.  
However, the main argument here is that design piracy should be treated the same way as counterfeiting, 
not to argue for the legal prohibition of counterfeiting per se.  
13 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended the term of copyright protection for most 
works to life plus 70 years.  See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending chapter 3, title 17, 
U.S.C., to extend the term of copyright protection for most works to life plus 70 years). 
14 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2008).  
15 This statement is made following the reasoning by analogy approach.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 is 
clear in showing that legislative history specifically excluded “ladies’ dress” from the subject matter of 
copyright law. 
 but this is not the case given the 
existence of a long established doctrine know as the “utilitarian doctrine” which prohibits 
the extension of copyright protection to useful articles.  Allowing copyright protection of 
useful articles raises legitimate concerns as it has the potential of resulting in far-reaching 
competitive advantages, but whether this is the case in the fashion design industry is 
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debatable.  Consumer choice seems to attach more importance to the aesthetics of a 
clothing design, and the status and prestige the design confers, rather than its functional 
aspects.  
¶16 In any case, the Copyright Act is clear: copyright doctrine protects original works 
insofar as their form but not their utilitarian aspects are concerned.16  One way to secure 
some protection is to separate original artistic parts from functional ones:  designs of 
useful articles shall be protected only to the extent that they incorporate pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural features that are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects 
of the same article.17  The fact that a useful article is attractively shaped does not render it 
eligible for copyright protection; only some non-useful features, which can be identified 
separately, might qualify for protection.18
¶17 It follows that some design elements, such as original fabric designs, have the 
potential of being the adequate subject for copyright protection, but clothing designs do 
not because their shapes are considered to have the primary utilitarian functions of 
covering the human body and keeping it warm.
  This involves a considerable degree of 
physical or at least conceptual separability. 
19  In most cases, fashion designs fail the 
separability test because creative expression is extrinsically compounded with practical 
utility.20  As one court concisely put it when addressing fashion designs’ copyrightability: 
“artistic and utilitarian elements are conceptually indivisible and, therefore, not 
copyrightable subject matter.”21  In the recent case of Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co.22 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that casino uniforms could not be 
copyrighted because the aesthetic value of clothing cannot conceptually be separated 
from its utilitarian function, 
¶18 It is going to be very difficult to succeed in proving separability between the design 
and its utility.  Only a few design piracy cases have been pursued under this legal theory, 
and only the most egregious cases have been successful.
namely the necessity of wearing it to perform one’s job 
adequately. 





18 37 C.F.R. §202.10 (c) (1959), revoked on Jan. 1, 1978 by 43 Fed. Reg. 966 (1978) and codified in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
19 The Copyright Act 1976 allows for the copyrightability of patterns but until then the applicable 
principles of law were set out in Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).  Cheney 
was in the business of producing silk fabric and Doris copied Cheney's patterns.  The Trial court found for 
Doris and the Appellate Court affirmed because at the time the Copyright Office was not accepting 
“patterns” as copyrightable subject matter.  The Appellate Court held that although Cheney had suffered 
harm no remedy did exist at common law and that it was up to the legislature to amend copyright law to 
address the issue. 
20 MELVIN B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 2.08[B][3].  Nimmer differentiates between fabric 
designs and dress designs and concludes that fabric designs are generally copyrightable since they could be 
marketable as art but clothing designs are not.  See also Olivera Medenica, Designers Seek to Prevent 
Cheaper Knockoffs, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 2006.  In Marzer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme 
Court found that some ceramic statues at the base of a mass-produced lamp were eligible for copyright 
protection as they were separable from the functional aspects of the lamp. 
21 Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2005). 
22 Id. 
23 In Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984), the Court awarded copyright protection to a 
swimsuit design that was so elaborately crafted it had little chance of being worn. 
24 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 the majority held that the metal belt buckles designed by Barry 
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Kieselstein reached out to the level of creative art,25 but the position of the dissenting 
judge was unbendable:  “Innovations of form are inseparable from the more important 
function they serve—helping to keep the tops of trousers at waist level.”26
¶19 This further exemplifies that copyright would only protect against unauthorized use 
and copying of artistic elements that exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.  The protection is limited to design elements such as individual patterns as well as 
fabric collections that present some elements of originality.
 
27  The threshold for 
originality is low, only some minimum degree of creativity has to be displayed.  
Copyright registration in the U.S. is a straightforward process only requiring filing a short 
application and paying a nominal fee.28
¶20 Over the past few years, designers have become more aggressive in pursuing 
infringers that are knocking-off their fabric designs.  As of October 2007, Forever 21, a 
fast-fashion merchandiser making a business out of copying high-end designers, has been 
the target of more than 20 lawsuits; some of them have been settled and others are still 
pending.
 
29  Designers Diane von Fürstenberg and Anne Sui seem to be very keen on 
enforcing their copyrights in fabric design as this is currently a powerful tool to succeed 
against copiers.30
B. Trade Dress 
 
¶21 The protection of trade dress, as governed by the Lanham Act, encompasses design 
and appearance of a product together with the elements making up the overall image that 
serves to identify the product presented to the consumer.31  To successfully pursue a 
claim for trade dress infringement a design must be non-functional, it must have acquired 
secondary meaning or be inherently distinctive, and its appropriation must be likely to 
cause confusion as to the origin of the product.32
¶22 The real challenge lies in proving inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning.  
This is further complicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Samara Brothers v. 
Wal-Mart,
  Although far from easy, proving the 
non-functionality requirement is not as lethal as the “utilitarian” aspect of copyright law, 




26 Id.  
27 In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytags Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995), the Court held that pattern can be 
protected as “writing or prints” under the Copyright Act. 
28 Forty-five dollars for a basic registration or thirty-five dollars if registration is filed online.  United 
States Copyright Office, Fees, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited on Apr. 18, 2010).  
29 Lisa Pearson et al., From Fashion Catwalks to the Courts, COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 23; see 
also Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 
1147, 1174 (2009). 
30 Forever 21’s $32 “Sabrina” smock dress looks suspiciously similar to Diane Fürstenberg’s $325 
“Cerisier” design, but the only way Diane von  Fürstenberg could prove her rights was by asserting her 
copyright in the fabric of the dress. 
31 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
32 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 
2A.01[1] (2006). 
33 Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 where the Court held that clothing designs are very rarely inherently 
distinctive and that distinctiveness would always require proof of secondary meaning, in 
the sense that consumers must regard the design feature as indicating the source of the 
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item.  This seems to imply that, in order to be protected under §43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
a design needs to symbolize a unique source identifier.  The Court’s ruling in Samara 
Brothers severely limited the scope of intellectual property protection for clothing 
designs under the trade dress heading, since the short life span of  “clothing’s 
marketability more or less precludes its attaining a secondary meaning until the item is no 
longer in fashion, at which point a suit to protect would be meaningless.”34  The Court 
acknowledged that most fashion designs are of volatile nature and are not intended to 
identify source but rather to render products more appealing.  He distinguishes packaging 
design, which usually is an automatic indicator of origin and therefore protected under 
§43(a) of the Lanham Act, from fashion design, which mainly appeals for its aesthetic 
function.  Although the Court did not carry this argument out any further, the thinking 
that the appeal of fashion designs lies in their aesthetic function seems to suggest that 
innovative designs are often insufficient proof of source for customers. Many designers 
have attempted to secure their creative work for an entire garment under trade dress 
protection, arguing that the product’s overall image justifies protection because it 
qualifies as a source of origin,35 but following the Samara ruling, only a few have been 
successful.  In Coach Inc. v. We Care Trading Co.,36
C. Design Patents 
 Coach was able to introduce enough 
evidence showing that its handbag design had gained secondary meaning:  satisfactory 
expert testimony, consumer surveys and evidence of advertising.  The Coach case is the 
exception that confirms the rule: only in very rare circumstances will fashion design be 
source-identifying as this is a very high standard for a product to meet. 
¶23 In order to have a valid design patent the claimed design depicted in the drawings 
must be “novel, non-obvious and non-functional ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”37  Design patents grant their inventors a monopoly over their innovative 
designs by giving them the exclusive right to manufacture, use and sell the patented 
design for a term of 14 years from issuance.  However, the difficulties in meeting the 
requirements for this form of protection with respect to fashion design are many.  Strict 
standards apply.  Considering that most fashion designs consist of slight variations of 
articles of clothing already on the market, the standard of non-obviousness can be very 
hard to meet.  The design has to be non-obvious in the eyes of someone skilled in the art, 
a fashion designer in this case.  If these obstacles are overcome, the protection granted is 
far-reaching,38 but at the expense of time and money.  It takes an average of two years to 
receive approval (or a rejection) from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
and the cost of a design patent application together with government fees and the added 
costs of a design patent attorney can amount to several thousand dollars.39
 
34 Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways Are No Longer The Public Domain: Applying The 
Common Law Right Of Publicity To Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43, 
55 (2001). 
35 Id. at 58. 
36 Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., No. 99 Civ. 11672, 2001 WL 812126, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 
2001). 
37 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (1988). 
38 Id. Design patents last for 14 years. 
  In a fast-
39 According to 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(b)(1) and Fee Code 1012/2012, the basic filing fee for a design patent 
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moving industry where the success of a particular design cannot be accurately predicted, 
companies are reluctant to invest large sums ex ante.  Jimmy Choo, a fashion house that 
is generally very keen on protecting its intellectual property rights and started to build up 
a design patent portfolio several years ago, now owns about 270 issued design patents.40  
About 50 of those relate to bags, but the majority, approximately 170 designs, relate to 
shoes.  However, most luxury fashion-houses still do not have any design patents as the 
overall process is too cumbersome and the prospects of protection are too uncertain given 
that the USPTO rejects roughly half of the applications that are filed.  Additionally, 
design patent infringement is found in only approximately half of the cases brought to 
court.41
D. Evaluation of the Current Protection 
 
¶24 There is no magic bullet for the protection of design rights.  A remedy can be 
sought within the patchwork of protections, which typically apply only to a limited aspect 
of the design and for too long a term to fit a fast-moving industry.42  As I have explained 
above, the scope of protection afforded by each of these areas may differ significantly, 
and it is often difficult to foresee and select the form of protection that will provide the 
broadest scope of rights.  Notably, judges have shown a very narrow attitude when the 
protection of fashion designs is at stake, and they have always tried to keep their 
interpretations as tight as possible.  The case law reviewed above has shown that, most of 
the time, courts recognized only clothes’ utilitarian function in the ambit of copyright and 
refused to find indication of source in the realm of trade dress.  This is indicative of the 
courts’ unwillingness to apply intellectual property protection to fashion designs in the 
absence of a clear authorization to do so.  There is some wiggle room, but it can only lead 
to uncertainty and inconsistent predictions so that one might say with enough confidence 
that the legal remedies currently available are insufficient to grant fashion designs 
adequate intellectual property protection.43
 
filed on or after December 8, 2004 is $220 and $110 for small entities.  Following 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(b) the 
issuance fees of $860 and $430 for small entities must be paid.  Julie P. Tsai, Comment, Fashioning 
Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion Designs in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
447, 457 (2005), notes that the average attorney fees amount to $1,100 per design.  
40 At the time of writing, January 2009, an extensive search was performed on United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Images Database at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
41 Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for Improving Industrial Design 
Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 555 (1999). 
42 In this sentence “too long a term” refers to the long terms of years that the current intellectual property 
options cover.  As mentioned above, copyright protection lasts for 70 years post mortem autorem, a design 
patent for 14 years, and a trade dress for as long as it is used/renewed.  Tsai, supra note 39 (arguing that 14 
years of protection for design patents is excessive for protecting fashion works that have a short life span). 
43 Another interestingly related argument is explored by Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, supra note 29 
(“Designers who are protected by trademark and trade dress innovate in ways that play to these legal 
advantages. The resulting effect on the direction of innovation is to favor innovation by designers who 
already enjoy existing protection by other aspects of intellectual property law, over innovation by 
designers—particularly small, new designers—who are not thus protected. The existence of some kinds of 
intellectual property protection combined with the absence of design protection also gives designers the 
incentive to create some kinds of products over others.”). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN PIRACY PROHIBITION ACT 
¶25 The Design Piracy Prohibition Act (“DPPA”), originally introduced by 
Congressman Bob Goodlatte in the House of Representatives on Mach 30, 2006, is 
intended to fill in the gap by amending Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act of 1976 so as to 
encompass fashion designs.44  In short, the DPPA would allow a designer to photograph a 
garment, digitally archive it, and register it for copyright protection for a nominal fee.45
A. Is There Need for This Legislation 
 
¶26 There is a need for legislation because the numbers show that design piracy is 
harming the design industry and consumers.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates 
that $12 billion in revenues were lost in 2006 because of piracy of apparel and fashion 
goods accounting for 5% of the nation’s $196 billion apparel market.46
¶27 The fact that the DPPA is stalled in Congress shows that the U.S. fashion world is 
split on the issue.  There is a sharp divide among legal scholars and representative 
members of the fashion community as to the potential benefits of the DPPA.  
Representatives of the California Fashion Association argue that if the bill is passed, 
designers’ inspiration would be stifled and many retailers would be exposed to frivolous 
lawsuits that would drive them out of business.  On the other side, designer-supporting 
organizations, such as the Council of Fashion Design America and the New York Council 
of Fashion Design, clearly support the initiative; many designers, among them Narciso 
Rodriguez, Diane von Fürstenberg and Zac Posen, complain that their designs have been 
pirated so much that their value is now diluted and their reputation damaged.
  The numbers in 
this study also include counterfeited items as usually every counterfeit garment starts as a 
pirated design—the real figure could actually be much higher due to the fact that design 
piracy is not outlawed.  However, the nature and the extent of the harm suffered by 
fashion designers due to the lack of legal protection is demonstrated not only in the 
economic loss of the fashion market, but also in the loss of goodwill and dilution which 
are not reflected by the above numbers. 
47
 
44 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006).  The proposed legislation would 
amend chapter 13 of title 17 of the United States Code.  The change will be de minimis:  the words “article 
of apparel” at § 1301 (b) would include fashion designs within the scope of copyright protection.  In 
addition it would just be another exception to the utilitarian doctrine, see vessel hulls and architectural 
designs. 
45 The exact amount is unclear as different sources give different values, but it will lie somewhere 
between $50 and $100. 
46 The U.S. Apparel Market 2007 Dresses Up . . . Way Up, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 18, 2008 (U.S. apparel sales 
reached $196 billion in 2007), available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_080318.html.  
Definite numbers on the costs of counterfeiting are hard to come by, but one study entitled “Economic 
Analysis of the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Initiative” prepared for the Coalition Against 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP) by LECG, November 2007 states that “the lost revenues due to 
counterfeiting and piracy of the apparel and fashion industry are estimated to be about $12 billion 
annually.” For more thorough information and market analysis figures on the Apparel Market in the United 
States, see Trends – An Annual Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Apparel and Footwear Industries, Compiled 
on Behalf of AAFA in Part By Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg. Annual Reports for years 2005, 2006, 2007 
available at http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/Statistics.asp (last visited on Mar. 18, 2010).  See also 
Maggie Overfelt, When Piracy Is Legal, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/23/smbusiness/whos_stealing_piracy_legal.fsb. 
47 See Eric Wilson, O.K., Knockoffs, This Is War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at G1.  The stories of 
individual designers can be found at http://www.counterfeitchic.com. 
  Other big 
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players, such as the National Retail Federation, do not take a public position due to a lack 
of internal consensus on the issue.  The academic world is also split.  Professor Susan 
Scafidi is a strong proponent of the DPPA48 whilst Professor Sprigman and Professor 
Ruastiala argue against it.49  The lack of unity around the proposal raises questions about 
the political economy of fashion.  It might be true to a certain extent that the fashion 
industry has thrived commercially without an explicit framework for intellectual property 
protection, but it is also true that design piracy cuts into sales, tarnishes a brand’s 
reputation and constitutes a major barrier for young designers trying to establish their 
identity in the marketplace.50
1. Technological Advance 
  I will now assess which of these arguments should be given 
greater weight. 
¶28 Early in the 20th century, the impact of copies of original fashion designs was more 
modest.  Designers enjoyed first mover rights by profiting from the exclusivity of their 
designs before competitors could copy them at a cheaper cost.  In that time gap, the 
designers reaped generally high profits from their original designs, before moving to the 
next trend.  In this scenario, the time lag between when a design was launched and when 
a copy could be reproduced would typically amount to several months, and the 
competitive advantage gained by the original creator in those months might be the best 
explanation on why the industry was able to thrive for so long without intellectual 
property protection. 
¶29 More recently, technological advances to the means of textile and garment 
production eroded that advantage by enabling fast manufacturing in places with cheaper 
labor.  Especially for developing countries, design piracy is efficient and lucrative: pirates 
copy designs from photographs of catwalks posted on the Internet and produce accurate 
copies even before real items are introduced into the market.51  It is also common for 
copycats to send spies to showrooms and take photographs of the garments.52
 
48 Susan Scafidi, F.I.T: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2008); see also 
Scafidi, supra note 1. 
49 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2006). 
50 Robin Givhan, The End of 'Gown in 60 Seconds'?, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2007, at C02. 
51 Teri Agins, Copy Shops:  Fashion Knockoffs Hit Stores before Originals As Designers, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 8, 1994, at A1. 
52 MARY GEHLHAR, THE FASHION DESIGNER SURVIVAL GUIDE 248 (Kaplan Publishing 2d ed. 2008). 
  It is these 
technological advances that increase the need for intellectual property protection.  The 
legal principle exempting fashion from copyright protection to encourage the growth of 
the industry seems to be outdated in this era of sophisticated and instantaneous mass 
copying.  New technologies threaten designers’ ability to compete with the products of 
lower cost countries, because the distribution of images of new designs and the 
automation of copying and manufacturing occur in the blink of an eye.  The days when 
Coco Chanel would say “copying is the highest form of flattery” are now over—piracy 
threatens the very existence of fashion designers.  In many cases, costs will not be 
recovered, and in the other cases only small margins will result from a severely limited 
first mover dynamic. 
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¶30 Copying generates inefficiencies in the market which result in economic losses to 
designers who are prevented from reaping a fair return on their investments.  If costs are 
not recovered, designers are forced to charge consumers higher prices.  Proponents of the 
bill have explained that one of the ideas behind it is to protect highly innovative designs 
at a time when they are sold at high prices, so that the costs can be recovered by 
prohibiting the sale of substantially similar items that would undercut the market.  The 
DPPA would guarantee a protection term of three years, which appears to be a modest 
term calibrated to address the specific problem of cost recovery and granting a reasonable 
expectation of exclusivity. 
2. Split Markets 
¶31 Landes and Posner suggest that copyright protection is not always necessary to 
incentivize creators because there are several factors that would limit copying even in the 
absence of copyright laws.53  They argue that the inferior quality of a plagiarized copy 
makes it an imperfect substitute for the real thing and that as a consequence there might 
not be negative effects on the market.  If this argument is taken and equally applied to the 
fashion design industry context, the result would be that the markets for top-end fashion 
and mass-market retailers would split because arguably no revenues are lost if consumers 
would not pay money for the original item in the first place.  The difficulty with this 
argument, and Landes and Posner recognize it later on, is that the fact that some 
customers of pirated copies would not have paid for the original item does not imply that 
all of them would not have paid.54  It is very difficult to ascertain the fraction of 
consumers who bought the pirated item, but would have been willing to pay the higher 
price of the original piece.55
¶32 It might be true that original designs and copies address different market segments 
and that therefore, designers do not lose customers and revenues, but this does not take 
into consideration that copying can occur between parties at the same level of the fashion 
industry.  One example of this horizontal copying occurred when Yves Saint Laurent 
successfully sued Ralph Lauren over a dinner jacket dress under French copyright law, 
and was awarded $395,000.
 
56
¶33 Vulnerability to economic loss can materialize even when copying occurs between 
different segments of the pyramid.  Lately we have been witnessing a democratization of 
style, that has shown that creative design does not only stem from haute couture fashion 
houses, but it may originate from many different sources and at all price levels.  Although 
  No matter at what level of the pyramid the copying occurs, 
as long as the parties are at the same level it is certain that someone will be hurt 
economically. 
 
53 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 41 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003). 
54 Id. at 47. 
55 Id. 
56 Societe Yves Saint Laurent Couture S.A. v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt. S.A., [1994] E.C.C. 
512, 514 (Trib. Comm. Paris); PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, AND 
THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE US ECONOMY 77 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1999) (“A French 
court ruled in favor of Yves Saint Laurent for ‘counterfeiting and disloyal competition’ against Ralph 
Lauren for copying a black tuxedo dress that was created in 1966.  Saint Laurent was awarded $395,000 in 
1994.”); see also Jennifer Mencken, Comment, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, 1997 B.C. INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. F. 121201 n.75 (1997). 
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a lot of copying still involves retailers copying high-end designers, this trend is slowly 
changing as some of the most aggressively copied designs are popularly priced.  For 
example, the Croc clogs for the summer and the Ugg boots for the winter have been 
copied widely at every level of the pyramid.  This emphasizes the need for design 
protection for every level of the industry that makes use of creative endeavor. 
¶34 In addition, within the past few years the threshold of creativity between different 
levels of the pyramid has become blurred as high-end designers have shown an 
increasing willingness to collaborate with large retailers through designer partnerships.  
For example, Isaac Mizrahi has agreed to design for Target, Chanel designer Karl 
Lagerfeld and Jimmy Choo created lines for H&M, Mark Eisen launched a sportswear 
collection for Wal-Mart, and many others followed on the same track.57  These 
collaborations allow top-end designers to apply their creativity to more affordable 
materials and the result is innovative design at a lower price, which means a greater 
percentage of the consuming public can afford the designs.  Given the weakness of the 
current IP regime, the designers, high-end or not, remain unprotected whether they create 
for Chanel or H&M.  Accordingly, a change in copyright law to incorporate fashion 
designs would enhance consumer welfare by increasing designers’ incentives to 
disseminate their creative work cheaply.58
¶35 In addition, notwithstanding the level at which the copying occurs, cheaper 
imitations do dilute original couture designs rather than serving as an advertising tool to 
the benefit of the designer.  Congress recognized a dilution cause of action under 
trademark law, and identified the harm associated with dilution as “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the 
presence or absence of . . . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”
 
59
¶36 Tailored copyright protection would prevent dilution to a certain extent and it 
would give high-end designers the means to make credible commitments about 
separation to consumers who expect to get an exclusive product for the price they are 
paying.  This would leave the door open for derivative works
  Consumers 
like the prestige that is conveyed by a trademark, by a design or by both of them together.  
The industry suffers if a design becomes diluted, because its aspirational value drops.  
Economic loss is not always present when the claim is one for dilution, sometimes 
unauthorized copying has no direct economic impact, but nonetheless it lessens the 
prestige and uniqueness of the product.  This mirrors the Landes and Posner scenario 
described above where the markets are separate because the plagiarized copy is of 
inferior quality, but other times the dilution of a design can cut into sales, for instance 
when a design is dropped by the industry when it becomes too widespread or associated 
with a less exclusive image. 
60
 
57 See Adam Jones & Elizabeth Rigby, A Good Fit? Designers and Mass Market chains Try to Stitch 
Their Fortunes Together, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005. 
58 It may also be argued that an increase in legal protection covering designs would decrease consumer 
welfare by allowing designers to charge higher prices due to the lack of competing alternatives. Which of 
the effects predominates in practice is an empirical question which is outside the scope of this article. 
59 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  
60 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 53, at 109 (quoting Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative 
Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209, 229 (1983)).  
—if designs are inspired 
by existing works no infringement claims should be possible especially in an industry 
Vol. 8:2] Silvia Beltrametti 
 161 
where some level of cross-pollination is crucial to its workability.  It turns out to be a 
question of degree, an issue that I discuss later. 
3. The Fashion Cycle of the Low IP Equilibrium 
¶37 In a piece titled “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design” Professors Sprigman and Raustiala analyze the proposed legislation in 
light of the fashion cycle maintenance, their own theory of interpretation of the fashion 
industry.61
¶38 They bring forward an argument, “induced obsolescence,” which describes how 
haute couture designers create fashion trends for a limited and exclusive clientele who 
generate a consistent profit in the immediate future.  When these high-end trends are then 
reinterpreted by mass market designers to be sold at a cheaper price, haute couture 
designers develop a subsequent distaste towards these cheap reinterpretations; “what is 
initially chic can rapidly become tacky . . . as it diffuses into the broader public”
  According to them, legislation prohibiting design piracy is unnecessary 
because the low intellectual property equilibrium and the resulting “reinterpretation, 
derivative reworking and copying” of designs is part of the very nature of the industry 
because it keeps the fashion cycle moving. 
62
¶39 This leads to their second argument: copying and reinterpreting successful designs 
helps “anchor” seasonal trends, which benefits the industry as a whole.  Raustiala and 
Sprigman see the equation “copying = contributing to the creation of a trend” as a key 
element of the fashion economy.  They claim that after being created by top-end 
designers, trends have to be communicated by the rest of the fashion pyramid because it 
is trends that drive the consumption of fashion: every season new trends come into being 
because they appeal to the masses.
 and it 
is this distaste that spurs them to move on and create newer looks.  This rapid spreading 
of copied designs leading towards exhaustion suggests that copying does not hinder 
creativity; on the contrary, it produces greater incentives to innovate among designers. 
63
¶40 Both arguments are in line with the truth that fashion designs have a short life, that 
people buy clothes to keep up with the latest style, and it is this that encourages designers 
to move forward and create new looks, but it does not take into account the complexity of 
the taste dependency of fashion.  Sprigman takes it a step further by saying that the 
industry has “developed an ecosystem that depends on copying,”
 
64
¶41 It might be true that the phenomena identified above, which are peculiar to fast 
moving industries, have allowed the industry to move on quickly, and that the 
introduction of intellectual property protection has the potential of making the fashion 
cycle slower and less trend-driven.  Springman and Raustiala offer a comprehensive 
analysis explaining why they perceive that the fashion industry as a whole works well 
and continues to be creative, however a breaking point must be defined when 
 but even here, it is 
difficult to see how the value of inciting people to conspicuous consumption can have 
any social benefits. 
 
61 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2006). 
62 Id. 
63 Mary Wood, Springman Urges Congress to Keep Fashion Copyright-Free, Virginia Law, News & 
Events, July 31, 2006, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/sprigman.htm. 
64 Id. 
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“referencing” becomes “pirating.”  The DPPA should be construed so that referencing is 
permitted and pirating prohibited.  The ability of creating a trend by being referenced is a 
motive of flattery for designers, and since the proposed bill would apply to garments “as 
a whole” it won’t prohibit original remixes.  It is widely accepted that nothing is entirely 
new or original in fashion design because the focus is on the re-contextualization and the 
recycling of previous ideas.  However, as mentioned above, the DPPA does not want to 
reshape the prerogatives on which fashion design is grounded—it’s scope should be to 
encompass literal copies only.  Once a strict standard of interpretation has been agreed 
on, the rhythm of the fashion cycle would not be disrupted. 
4. The Piracy Business Model versus The Industry of “Young” Designers 
¶42 The price of fashion at every level of the pyramid is justified by the time and effort 
designers spend researching fabrics, ideas and techniques.65  Becoming a fashion designer 
takes years of training in design schools and as apprentices, large investments of money 
for the development of new and unusual fabrics, not to mention the high expenses 
associated with the marketing and the runway shows, which include models, samples, 
photographers, stylists, space etc.  Although it is to be noted that copyright law in the 
U.S. has never recognized the “sweat of the brow” doctrine,66 which states that someone 
can gain IP rights through efforts expended in labor and not necessarily resulting in 
original work, all this hard work must justify some sort of protection because originality 
in this segment of the industry will generally be appreciated by the public only once the 
hard work part has been satisfied.67  It is not just the free ride on research costs that 
justifies intellectual property protection in the fashion industry, but copiers also avoid the 
deadweight loss68
 
65 Wilson, supra note 47. 
66 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
67 Design Law – Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries: Hearing on H.R. 2033 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Internet and Intellectual Property of H. Committee on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of William Delahunt, House Representative); id. 
(statement of Narciso Rodriguez, Counsel of Fashion Designers); see also Susan Scafidi, Washington 
Fashion Week 2: The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, Feb. 19, 2008, 
http://www.counterfeit chic.com/2008/02/Washington_fashion_week_2_the.php (referring to Narcisco 
Rodriguez’s statement, “[h]is very personal prepared statement told the story of a Cuban-American boy 
who took out loans to attend Parsons and got his big break when he made a wedding gown for his dear 
friend Carolyn Bessette's marriage to John F. Kennedy, Jr., only to see it copied nearly 8 million times.  He 
sold 40.  Publicity may be nice, but it doesn't pay the bills.”). 
 of the designs that turn out to be unpopular, but where resources have 
been spent already.  The absence of protection for fashion designs in the U.S. made the 
economic position of young designers particularly vulnerable as companies with piracy 
as a business model became widespread.  These companies’ business is based on 
warehousing cheap material and copying successful designs.  They do not invest any 
capital in paying designers since their designs can be freely appropriated anyway, and 
saving on designers equals saving the costs listed above, mainly the ones associated with 
68 In economic terms, a deadweight loss is a loss of economic efficiency that comes into play when the 
equilibrium for products or services is not optimal and improvements can be made.  For an accurate 
definition of deadweight loss see HAL R.VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICRO ECONOMICS 431-34 (Norton 
2006). 
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the runway.  They focus on the output and on maintaining low prices.  As Scafidi put it, 
“[t]he copyists are professionals, in the game for cash, not creativity.”69
¶43 If the DPPA is passed, mass market retailers would face the peril of lawsuits being 
filed over exceedingly similar copies and this will force them to hire designers, which 
would benefit the public in two ways: more jobs and a richer choice of designs would be 
on the market.  Right now, the jobs that could employ young American designers are 
sacrificed in favor of sweatshop labor in developing countries, where the copies are 
manufactured.  No wonder that emerging Asian economies are growing industries based 
on copying, manufacturing and exporting American fashion designs as long as it is legal.  
This piracy business model also hinders the export opportunities for America. 
 
¶44 Knockoffs devalue designs to the point that wholesale orders are cancelled,70
¶45 It has been questioned whether the DPPA is more concerned with protecting 
creativity or luxury fashion houses with money.  It is to a certain extent true that the top 
slice of the fashion pyramid has better means to afford pursuit of legal actions for design 
infringement, but the bill will also give a strong weapon to creative young minds who 
come up with brilliant new ideas.  It would be a massive improvement for every designer, 
regardless of whether well-established or young, given that the status quo only allows for 
custom recordal options and for the sending of a cease and desist letter trying to persuade 
the infringing party with moral and uncertain legal arguments.
 and 
this is threatening for young designers especially.  More settled designers rely on their 
well-established trademarks as these are the essence of their revenues and profits, 
because they are protected by anti-counterfeiting provisions.  Alain Coblence, a lawyer 
hired by the Council of Fashion Designers, gives voice to the legitimate concerns of 
designers: “designers now must ask what is the incentive to innovate if you know your 
creation is going to be stolen within days and your designs are going to be used before 
you have a chance to use them for yourself?”  And this goes back to the constitutional 
intent of copyright law. 
71
 
69 The copyists recognize that in certain instances, when the particular design falls in one of the 
traditional intellectual property doctrines (discussed above) there are costs of copying—but these are 
calculated beforehand, so that in the end it is still more convenient for them to pay the damages than to hire 
designers.  It must also be acknowledged that many companies who adopt this piracy business model, offer 
a vast variety of choice of goods which have been copied from the most different sources, so that in the 
eventuality of a lawsuit their whole business plan is not ruined. 
70 Consider the example of Ananas, a relatively young (5-year-old) handbag label.  Its co-founder, a 
young wife and mother working from home in the suburbs of Washington successfully promoted her 
handbags, which retailed between $200-$400.  In 2006, she received a call cancelling a wholesale order.  
The buyer explained that he found virtually identical copies of her bags at a lower price. Copies of her bags 
were popular on the Internet, too.  Ananas is still in business at present, but this loss of both wholesale and 
retail sale was a significant blow to a small business. 
71 It can also be argued that design protection is more important for young designers following the 
argument made by Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, supra note 29 (“Luxury firms are already well 
protected by the existing trademark and trade dress legal regime, brand investments, and the relatively 
small overlap between markets for the original and for the copy.  The main threat posed by copyists is to 
innovation by smaller, less established, independent designers who are less protected along all of these 
dimensions. Affording design protection would level the playing field with respect to protection from 
copyists and allow more such designers to enter, create, and be profitable.”). 
  Cease and desist letters 
based on the new legislation would contain compelling reasons to refrain from copying 
and in the case of lawsuits, copiers will be likely to settle. 
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¶46 The U.S. fashion industry is vibrant, but it is young.72  The bill would defend young 
designers who are not so well established and still vulnerable prey to mass market copiers 
by giving them three years in which they can exploit their ideas in the marketplace by 
themselves.  It does not seem that this is asking Congress for too much.  During the three 
years of protection that the DPPA envisages, designers can decide to pursue design 
patents for their most successful creations, if they want to seek continuing IP protection.  
The businesses adopting the pirating strategies described above are lobbying against the 
DPPA saying that the costs of facing lawsuits and the difficulty in obtaining financing 
would drive them out of business.73
V. THE DPPA AND ITS SCOPE 
  This is not true, they will just be forced to adapt their 
business model to the new intellectual property laws and employ more innovative young 
designers instead of relying on piracy. 
¶47 Now that I have ascertained that there is harm and therefore, a need for a legislative 
measure in this direction, I will evaluate if the proposed bill is satisfactory.  If it creates a 
successful mechanism that combats the harm caused by the copying that occurs at every 
level. 
¶48 The DPPA, if passed, would amend the section devoted to the “Protection of 
Original Designs,” under Chapter 13 of Title 17 of the United States Code, which 
currently protects vessel hulls, so as to include fashion designs.74  Fashion designs would 
receive protection for “the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its 
ornamentation” with  “apparel” defined to include  “men’s, women’s, or children’s 
clothing, including undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear . . . 
handbags, purses, and tote bags . . . belts and . . . eyeglass frames.”75  The Register of 
Copyrights would determine whether the purported design fits the category, and if it 
does, then it will be registered.  Damages for infringement can reach the amount of 
$250,000 or $5 per copy, whichever is greater, and designers could eventually appeal for 
the destruction of pirated goods.  The envisaged term of protection is three years (non-
renewable) upon the earlier of the date of publication of the registration76 or the date the 
design is first made public.77  Exempt from protection are fashion designs that were made 
public more than three months prior to the filing of the registration application.  The act 
prohibits the making of closely and substantially similar copies of original work.  Civil 
actions can be brought against people who “make, have made, import, sell or distribute 
any article embodying a design, which was created with knowledge or reasonable 
grounds to believe that the design was protected and copied.”78
 
72 Hearing, supra note 67 (statement of William Delahunt, House Representative). 
73 Hearing, supra note 67 (statement of Steve Maiman, Stony Apparel Corp.).  
74 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2007). 
75 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (2007). 
76 17 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2007). 
77 17 U.S.C. § 1310(b) (2007). 
78 17 U.S.C. § 1308 (2007). 
  The doctrines of 
secondary infringement and secondary liability can be applied to actions related to 
original designs.  Importantly the bill does not apply retrospectively.  Finally, if a claim 
under other intellectual property categories is possible, it shall not be precluded. 
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A. Potential Problems of the DPPA 
¶49 The legislation is far from perfect.  The biggest paradox is that the DPPA extends 
copyright protection to fashion designs without resolving questions concerning the 
functionality barrier79 to serve as a legislative exception to copyright’s utilitarian doctrine 
as discussed above.80
1. Flexibility of Copyright Law 
  Also, many questions surrounding the actual scope of protection of 
the Act could make enforcement complex. 
¶50 As we have seen above, the useful article doctrine of copyright law impedes the 
protection of fashion designs under copyright law, notwithstanding whether the creative 
expression is such as to make some of them adequate subject matter of copyright 
protection.  The current bill proposes to add “fashion design” under a general design 
protection statute.  Up to now, the copyright statute has allowed copyright protection of 
useful articles and then restricted the definition of useful articles to vessel hulls.  By 
granting vessel hulls a sui generis, but copyright-like form of protection, copyright’s 
useful articles rule was ignored and forms of expression compounded into useful objects 
that could otherwise not have been protectable under copyright now are.  It can be argued 
that instead of ignoring a well-established doctrine that prohibits the protection of items 
which serve a useful function, a better way to deal with the protection of fashion designs 
could have been negotiated through the expansion of copyright protection. 
¶51 A doctrinally more integral way to approach the protection of fashion designs 
would be limiting the scope of the useful article rule, instead of eliminating it.  This 
happened already in 1990 with the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act,81
2. The Standard of Orginality 
 
where Congress changed the application of the useful articles rule and extended copyright 
protection to “built” architecture (architectural designs embodied in actual buildings) 
without disturbing the broader coherence of copyright laws.  As Congress has 
demonstrated a willingness to be flexible in expanding Copyright laws with respect to 
architecture, the same action could be taken with respect to fashion.  This way Congress 
would reverse the traditional presumptions of the useful articles doctrine instead of 
eliding it. 
¶52 Definitions in the DPPA are not specific enough in defining what designs would 
merit copyright protection.  The wording of the DPPA grants copyright protection to “the 
appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including its ornamentation”82
 
79 2 JAY DRALTER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY § 1.02[5] (1991) (“The doctrine of functionality nicely separates he domain of trademarks from 
that of utility patents by precluding trademark protection for any product feature that is dictated by its 
utilitarian function.”). 
80 Kamal Preet, Why America Needs a European Fashion Police, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 386, 
390 (2008). 
81 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
82 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(7) (2007). 
 and further 
provides that “a design shall not be deemed to have been copied . . . if it is original and 
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not closely and substantially similar in overall visual appearance to a protected design.”83
¶53 It is clear from the Committee minutes that the bill is not trying to extend copyright 
protection to trends; on the contrary, there was uniform agreement on the necessity of 
protecting the development of specific styles.
  
Sometimes it might be difficult to determine originality because many designs are 
inspired by existing designs and trends.  There is a fine balance to be drawn if the fashion 
industry is not to be stifled and more guidance is needed for the evaluation of 
infringement as a whole in order to save the court the trouble of applying imprecise 
standards. 
84
¶54 The substantially similar approach is a better standard because it is more flexible.  
This would allow judges to be strict when comparing two designs, but at the same time it 
would allow them to be able to outlaw copies that have been amended only slightly but 
are in fact clear plagiarisms.  The “substantially similar” standard works best if coupled 
with a formalist approach.  This way, only objectively close copies would be prohibited, 
and safe and predictable interpretations would be possible.  In case of doubt, courts 
should be free to consult fashion industry experts, or other generally accepted standards 
of the fashion community.
  The language used by the bill suggests 
that only closely and substantially similar garments will be infringing.  Some 
commentators argue that the “substantially similar” standard is too broad and that a 
“virtually identical” standard would be better.  The latter would prohibit line-to-line 
copying only and this would avoid different courts coming out with different definitions.  
However, if the definition is restricted in this way, clever copyists would continue 
copying by moving small details, such as a zipper or a button and argue that the new item 
cannot be a virtually identical copy.  The prohibition of identical or virtually identical 
copies is too narrow and will not catch copies that have been modified only slightly, 
whereas substantially similar copies may generate too much debate and prove to be costly 
and unpredictable. 
85
¶55 Prohibiting closely or substantially similar copies is consistent with the generally 
applied standard in copyright law.  With regards to literary or artistic work, copyright has 
been clearly capable of allowing trends and styles and punishing plagiarism—why should 
the same not work within the fashion industry?  It is crucial that legal rights are only 
given out to truly novel designs and only close copies should be prohibited.  It is 
expected that designers will register selectively and only non-commonplace designs will 
secure protection.  This will enable the bill to catch copies and allow trends—which is the 
underlying intention of the bill. 
 
 
83 Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957 § 2(c)-(d) (2007). 
84 A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R.5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
85 The division in formalist, intentionalist and institutionalist approaches has been developed by 
Professor Alfred Yen and its application to the standards set out by the DPPA has been developed by 
Elizabeth Johnson. See Elizabeth F. Johnson, Comment, Defining Fashion: Interpreting the Scope of the 
Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 729 (2008). 
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3. Adjudicative Powers 
¶56 According to the bill the Copyright Office won’t take any position as to the merits 
of a design; on whether it is sufficiently original or distinctive enough to enjoy 
protection.  The Copyright Office would only be in charge of making a determination as 
to whether or not the application relates to a design which is subject to protection 
according to the categories proposed by the bill. 
¶57 Originality thresholds will be determined by courts of law, because they are 
thought to be in a better position to weigh the evidence that will help them in making a 
more informed determination.  Ominous voices say that because of the wide-ranging 
cross-pollination in the development of trends, identifying an original design is already 
difficult for someone within the industry.  Thus, how can we expect courts to get it right?  
This would raise issues as to the fair enforcement of the Act. 
¶58 The risk of broad interpretations of the DPPA is balanced by the traditionally 
narrow and careful attitude of common law judges towards widely drafted legislation.  
American judges would most probably refrain from libertarian moves when interpreting 
the DPPA and stick to a more conservative reading.  This can be safely assumed after 
inspecting the overly careful attitude adopted in the case law involving the protection of 
fashion designs under the current regime, as I explained above in section III. 
4. Remedies 
¶59 Also the scope of remedies should be revised; seeking $250,000 or $5 respectively 
for infringement does not reflect the real injury occurring to a designer, the popularity of 
the design, the speed with which it appears on the market, the ex ante costs incurred and 
the profits made.  Some kind of broader remedial flexibility is needed.86
¶60 In addition, the bill would increase the overall damages available under Chapter 13.  
A penalty of $250.000 would exceed the maximum award of statutory damages available 
for copyright infringement, which amounts to $150,000 in cases of willful infringement.  
There is some skepticism about whether the maximum award for infringement of a 
protected design should exceed the maximum award for copyright infringement.  In 
addition, it is not clear whether the damages should be of compensatory nature only or if 
the court is given discretion to make a determination as to what it thinks is just.
 
87
VI. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DESIGN AND THE DPPA COMPARED 
  Clearer 
guidance relating to the calculation and availability of damages is warranted. 
¶61 The European Community Design Protection Regulation, which became directly 
applicable in all member states on March 6, 2002 created a unified design protection 
system within the European Union.88
 
86 Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats:  Why Congress Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305 (2007). 
87 Hearing, supra note 67.  
88 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14), available at 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/6-02-CV-en.pdf. 
  The Regulation establishes a two tier protection 
system: first through the automatic creation of the unregistered community design (UCD) 
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as from first disclosure of the design in the community and second, the protection of a 
registered community design (RCD) through registration at the Office for Harmonization 
in the Internal Market in Alicante (OHIM).89  Both provide designers with exclusive 
rights to use their designs in commerce, take legal actions against infringers, and claim 
damages.  The Community Design has equal effect throughout the EU so that 
registrations, transfers, surrenders, invalidity actions, and prohibited use will have effect 
in twenty-seven countries simultaneously.  Because or despite this Regulation, Europe 
remains the hub of haute couture.90  Notably in many EU countries the Regulation works 
in tandem with national laws protecting the national fashion industry and because of their 
ongoing historical importance in the fashion design scene it comes as no surprise that the 
French and the Italians have the most stringent national regimes.91
¶62 The crucial difference between the design rights as set out in the DPPA and the 
European Regulation is that the American system extends copyright protection to 
incorporate design rights whilst the European system grants an exclusive and independent 
right that does not interfere with other statutorily protected intellectual property rights.  
Doctrinally, the latter approach is preferred as it is easier and more dynamic to rule on a 
self-standing right than attempting an interpretation which has to take into consideration 
the whole law on copyrights.  European designs do not need to cover non-functional 
products as long as the aesthetics are not entirely dictated by its function.  It would be 
more convenient for the U.S. to have an independent body of laws regulating the 
protection of fashion designs so that the confrontation with the utilitarian doctrine is 




89 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market in Alicante, Spain, www.oami.europa.eu/ (last visited 
on Mar. 16, 2010). 
90 Preet, supra note 80, at 386. 
91  UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC, 
INDUSTRIAL, AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGNS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF THE E.C. DESIGN 
REGULATION, THE E.C. DESIGN DIRECTIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL DESIGN PROTECTION 13-010 (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell 2000)  Suthersanen notes that: 
Registered design protection is available under Book 5 of the [French Intellectual 
Property] Code. Due to the availability of copyright protection, the sui generis design law 
has become something of a white elephant. Whether this position will change with the 
implementation of the E.C. Directive remains to be seen as the latter does not attempt to 
curtail the wide protection offered under the French copyright law. 
Id. at 13-010.  She also notes that: 
French law has firmly adhered to the totally cumulative approach towards the 
protection of designs and models since the 1940s. Under this approach, simultaneous 
protection for designs is assured under both design and copyright laws. . . . 
The Italian design law adopts a patent-style protection scheme for designs upon 
registration, a design patent is conferred on the applicant. . . . 
The [Italian] design patent lawyer is granted an exclusive right to use his design. The 
initial term of protection is fifteen years from the day following the filing of the 
application. . . . 
Id. at 13-012, 15-054, 15-054; see also Scafidi, supra note 1, at 118 (“France has the world’s strongest 
legal protections for fashion design, and Paris remains the world’s fashion capital.”). 
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A. Registered Community Design 
¶63 Applying for a RCD is easy and affordable.  One application in one language and 
one fee payment92
¶64 What is different is that with the RCD there is no upper limit to the number of 
designs in one application,
 to OHIM is enough in order to gain EU wide protection.  The RCD 
lasts five years and can be renewed up to an additional four times, which grants a 
maximum protection of twenty-five years.  The design right proposed by the DPPA is 
similar to the RCD but with the shorter duration of three years. 
93
¶65 Another difference concerns the time lag between the placing of a design on the 
market and registration.  In the EU, publication in the Community Design Bulletin
 which means that a single application can contain multiple 
designs.  Although it is not imperative that the designs bear relation to each other, this is 
useful if a collection of similar clothing designs is being launched on the market.  A 
revised version of the DPPA should take this into consideration. 
94 can 
be deferred on request and there is a twelve month grace period.  Grace period means that 
disclosure of the design either with or without the will of the owner is not taken into 
account to assess novelty or individual character of a claim if it has happened “during the 
12 months period preceding the date of filing of the application or, if priority is claimed, 
the date of priority.”95
B. Unregistered Community Design 
  This means that if the success of a design is uncertain, the 
designer can test the market for a year and enjoy unregistered design rights before 
seeking a RCD.  Applications for design rights under the DPPA can be filed within three 
months from the launch of the design, which in many instances is not enough to test the 
success of a design. 
¶66 The DPPA does not envision the possibility of unregistered design protection 
which is in fact the Herculean weapon in the European design battlefield.  In order to 
enjoy UCD protection, all that is needed is to make the design available to the public 
within the Community.  Disclosure to the public does not exclusively mean availability 
on the market, but also its presentation at trade exhibitions, fairs or advertisement in 
various media.  The UCD lasts for three years from first disclosure.  The unregistered 
design can be a very powerful tool for fashion businesses that regularly launch far 
ranging collections into the market and do not have enough resources to keep up with 
registrations.  Especially in the fashion industry, the length of the protection provided is 
not as important as the need to dispense with formalities and expenses of registering 
designs pre-launch.  It is also often difficult to predict which designs will be successful 
and consequently copied.  The main difficulty with the UCD is proving the existence of 
 
92 Registration fees for one design are €230 plus €120 for publication, attorney costs will usually not 
exceed €700, but additional costs can come into play if extra drawings or photographs are to be submitted 
with the application. 
93 As long as they belong to the same Locarno class, but each design application has to be paid for 
individually. 
94 See Community Designs Bulletin, EU Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/bull.htm (last visited on Feb. 23, 2010).  
95 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14) ART 5, 
§1(b). 
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the right, but once the necessary legal grounds for protection can be made out, the right 
becomes extraordinarily useful in the fashion industry where turnovers are high and 
designs have only a seasonal life.  The DPPA does not envisage unregistered designs, and 
this is unfortunate because it seems that the protection afforded by it bears a much more 
realistic application to the way the fashion industry works.  Unregistered design rights 
should be included in the DPPA if a comprehensive system is to be put in place. 
C. Threshold for the Protection of the RCD and the UCD 
¶67 The common elements of the two types of protection available under the 
Regulation include their unitary character, definitions and their scope of protection.  
“Design” is defined as “the appearance of the whole or part of the product resulting from 
its features and, in particular, the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture and/or materials 
of the product itself and/or its ornamentation.”96
¶68 The definitions are more accurately articulated in the European legislation.  
European designs will be protected only once proof of novelty and individual character 
can be shown, as opposed to the proposed American legislation that does not define the 
specifics of originality but only adds that it should not be “closely and substantially 
similar in overall visual appearance to a protected design.”
  There are two requirements for design 
protection: novelty and individual character.  A design is new if no identical design has 
previously been made available to the public and it is considered to have individual 
character if the overall impression produced by it on the informed user differs from the 
overall impression made by any design previously available to the public. 
97
D. Case Law in Europe 
  Unsurprisingly, the 
comprehensiveness of the definitions in the European Regulations trace back to a civil 
law approach whilst common law countries rely less on definitions and more on 
convention and judicial restraint.  Although U.S. judges are likely to rule as severely even 
in the absence of detailed legal specifications, awareness of the European definitions 
might provide useful analytical tools against which to test an American design. 
¶69 Some American pundits like to argue that despite such powerful and efficient tools, 
there has not been much case law relating to the enforcement of the registered and 
unregistered European Designs.  This fact is exploited to maintain that the 
underutilization of EU protection evidences the efficiencies accruing with a low IP 
environment, but this is a misconception.  The reason why case law has been scarce is 
because parties usually reach confidential settlements in this area of law, which are made 
public only in the most blatant circumstances.  For example, Jimmy Choo received over 
£80,000 in compensation from NewLook, which was forced to withdraw thousands of 
“Bonbon” shoes from the market following threatened legal action, and Chloe received 
around £12,000 from Topshop who plagiarized its lemon yellow dungaree dress.98
 
96 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 O.J. (L 3, 1.2002, p. 1), amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 O.J. (L 386, 29.12.2006, p.14) ART 3(a). 
97 17 U.S.C. §1309 (e) (2007). 
  None 
98 Dan Newling, Thousands of £20 High Street Bags Trashed for Looking too Similar to a £650 Jimmy 
Choo, THE DAILY MAIL, Nov. 12, 2007; Emil Dugan, Topshop Ordered to Destroy Dresses 'Copied from 
Chloé Design', THE INDEPENDENT, July 27, 2007; Martin Beckforth, Topshop Destroys its 'Chloé' Dresses, 
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of these cases made it to court, and this highlights the importance of the very recent 
Karen Millen and Jimmy Choo cases in laying down precedents for registered and 
unregistered design protection.  These latter cases further illustrate how judges set a 
threshold for protection and that unregistered rights are of inestimable importance in this 
branch of the industry. 
1. Karen Miller 
¶70 Karen Millen won a landmark victory against Dunnes Stores, an Irish retailer, after 
long-lasting court hearings in Dublin’s commercial court.99  Karen Millen claimed that 
Dunnes Stores had directly copied three unregistered designs of ladies’ clothing.  It was 
clear from the evidence that was brought forward that it was the intention of the 
defendant to copy those designs.  The crux was whether Karen Millen’s designs qualified 
for UCD protection, whether they could be considered “new” and with “individual 
character.”  The designs were held to be new because no identical ones had been 
previously available on the market.  By determining whether the design had individual 
character, the court had to decide whether the overall impression it produced on the 
informed user differed from that produced by the existing body of designs available on 
the market.  Ms. Justice Mary Finlay Geoghean defined an informed user as “a woman 
with a keen sense of fashion, a good knowledge of designs of women’s tops and shirts 
previously made available to the public, alert to design and with a basic understanding of 
any functional or technical limitations on designs for women’s tops and shirts.”  
Although the defendants had identified and submitted a number of prior designs that 
contained elements of the Karen Millen designs, the judge held that there was great scope 
for variation in the previous designs and therefore the overall impression of the disputed 
items on the notional informed user clearly differed from the prior art.  Thus, Karen 
Millen was held to possess valid unregistered Community Design rights that it could 
enforce against Dunnes.  Delivery of all infringing items and an accounting of profits 
made in respect to the sales of the infringing items were ordered.  Dunnes has reportedly 
appealed and two further cases dealing with similar issues have been adjourned pending 
the outcome of this appeal.100
2. Jimmy Choo 
  The results are anxiously awaited in the industry. 
¶71 In January 2008, Jimmy Choo brought an action against retailer Towerstone for 
infringing registered and unregistered design rights in its Ramona bag.101
 
THE TELEGRAPH, July 26, 2007; Tenisha Anderson, 
  The court 
found that Towerstone’s handbag infringed Jimmy Choo’s Community Registered 
Design, because, in essence, from the overall impression the “informed user” would 
Topshop. More like Copy-shop., IPAPIER, July 27, 
2007. 
99 Karen Millen Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores, [2007] I.E.H.C. 449 (H.Ct., 21st December, 2007) (Ir.) available 
at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2007/H449.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); see Margaret Tofalides 
& Lauren Orakwusi, Fashion Victim: Clothing Copycat Victory Under EU Design Regulations, 
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 13. 
100 Whistles and Coast have brought actions against Dunnes stores too. 
101 J Choo (Jersey) Ltd. v. Towerstone Ltd., [2008] E.W.H.C. 346 (H.Ct., 16th January, 2008) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/346.html; see Simon Clark & Gavin 
Llewellyn, Innocence Defence Goes Out of Fashion, COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 2008, at 13. 
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regard two handbags as being the same.  In addition, the Court held that Choo’s 
unregistered design right had been infringed.  For infringement to be found, the 
infringing design must have copied the unregistered design.  The Court found that the 
number of similarities between the two handbags was such that the only explanation was 
that the Towerstone handbag was a copy. 
VII. FINAL COMMENTS 
¶72 In a world where simultaneous copying rages and piracy has become a business 
model, legislation addressing fashion designers’ rights is a necessary addition to U.S. 
intellectual property law and a fair complement to anti-counterfeiting measures.  The 
DPPA is designed to protect innovative designers and ensure that they gain benefits from 
their intellectual investments.  This is the very basis of intellectual property protection, 
and it should be applied to the fashion industry at a very basic level.  If anti-piracy 
legislation passes, it would be a first step towards an international alignment of design 
rights and it would provide a basis for a more global enforcement.  Lawyer Alain 
Coblence, hired by fashion trade groups in Milan and Paris, said that the impetus for 
lobbying Congress came from meetings with French and Italian designers who wanted 
comparable legal standards to apply in the U.S.102
¶73 The DPPA would grant a weaker protection than its European counterpart.  Much 
can be done to improve it, for instance the inclusion of a reduced protection term for 
unregistered design rights, but once it undergoes a few modifications it constitutes a fair 
effort to protect and encourage both young and established haute couture designers.  
Importantly the DPPA has to be understood as a measure sensitive to the industry’s 
innovative culture—it does not want to inhibit designers from interpreting ideas that 
make out a trend.  Once the scope of protection of the Act is clarified and once it is 
acknowledged that only unique designs enjoy protection and that only very close copying 
would be prohibited, the DPPA will be an overall appropriate and balanced measure, and 
with its short-term, narrowly crafted protection for the fashion industry, it proves that 
copyright law can be construed to serve the interest of both, creators and the public.
  There is a fear that the fashion design 
industry would start to migrate to Europe if no action is taken. 
103
¶74 Like in Europe, the bill is meant as a deterrent, rather than an inducement to file 
lawsuits.  Potentially the most dangerous variable is the well-known American keenness 
towards litigation.
  It 
will recognize that part of the nature of fashion is cross-pollination and mass marketers 
could still produce goods inspired by designer collections.  Within this scenario, 
consumers will retain the right to be stylishly dressed at affordable prices and fashion 
design would get more respect as a creative endeavor worth defending. 
104
 
102 Wilson, supra note 47. 
103 Hearing, supra note 67 (Statement of Susan Scafidi, Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School) (“So 
H.R. 5055, with its short-term, narrowly tailored protection for the fashion industry is, I think, a 
groundbreaking example of how copyright law can be narrowly tailored, and carefully designed to serve 
the creators and the public interest.”). 
104 Hearing, supra note 67 (Statement of Christopher Sprigman, Associate Professor, University of 
Virginia School of Law) (“Unlike most countries in Europe, which have relatively weak civil litigation 
systems, we Americans are, for better or worse, accustomed to resolving disputes through the courts.”). 
  It is hard to predict how this historical tradition coupled with U.S. 
free trade culture will play out this time, but the DPPA has the potential of being a 
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narrowly tailored measure reflecting the unique seasonality of the fashion industry and it 
can be safely assumed that the American judicial attitude towards narrow interpretations 
will prohibit only very close copying.  If the standards are kept high, the danger of 
frivolous lawsuits is non-existent and trends will be safeguarded.  It is true that legal 
standards have to converge in order to be able to do business and discourage piracy in a 
more globalised world but it would be a mistake not to be culturally sensitive to reactions 
of different countries. 
¶75 Opponents of the DPPA assert that the American fashion industry is thriving as a 
massive $310 billion business and regularly ask, why fix something that is not broken?105
 
105 This is the underlying thesis of Sprigman and Raustiala’s paper, see Raustiala & Sprigman, supra 
note 61, and the question also came up in the testimony of Steve Maiman, see Hearing, supra note 67 
(Statement of Steve Maiman, Stony Apparel Corp.). 
  
The answer is plain: to act proactively to prevent it from breaking down.  The low IP 
equilibrium is likely to fall under the pressure of technological advancement and the 
subsequent shift in the scale of production, and this makes a strong case for a limited and 
specific form of intellectual property protection for fashion design.  The legislation has 
momentum because the fear of free-riding feeds the appetite for intellectual property 
expansion.  Furthermore, once satiated the fashion industry may thrive even more. 
